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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, twelve-year old student Sawyer Rosenstein contacted his 
guidance counselor on numerous occasions to report having been 
subjected to bullying and seek advice on how to best address the 
* Diane M. Holben, Ed.D, is Assistant Superintendent for the North Penn (PA) School District, and 
Perry A. Zirkel, Ph.D., is University Professor of Education and Law at Lehigh University. 
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situation.  In May of that year, one of the bullies punched Sawyer in the 
back with such force as to cause a blood clot that rendered him 
paralyzed from the waist down.  Sawyer’s parents filed suit against the 
New Jersey district.  The suit reportedly resulted in a settlement for 
$4,200,000.1 
The bullying behavior that this case represents is not an anomaly.  
The perceived frequency and consequences of bullying have been the 
focus of news media attention across the country, particularly in cases 
where the victim ultimately committed suicide rather than continue to 
suffer the abuse.2  Hollywood has also spotlighted the perils of bullying 
in movies such as the documentary, Bully.3  The political realm has 
reflected and reinforced this concern.  Many states have enacted or 
expanded anti-bullying laws for public schools,4 and the U.S. 
Department of Education hosted its third national Bullying Summit in 
August 2012.5 
As a result of this media and political attention, the increasing 
expectation is that schools will identify and minimize bullying behaviors 
among students.  While anti-bullying statutes seldom include a private 
right of action,6 bullied students and their parents may seek legal redress 
under federal civil rights laws and/or state tort law.  However, in contrast 
to coverage of the number and nature of the state laws7 and of the 
doctrinal details of occasional high-profile cases,8 the literature lacks 
 1.  KSEE News, Teen Paralyzed by Punch from Bully Wins Multi-Million Dollar Lawsuit, 
Apr. 19, 2012, http://www.ksee24.com/news/local/Teen-Parlalyzed-by-Punch-from-Bully-Wins-
Multi-Million-Dollar-Lawsuit-148177045.html. 
 2.  See, e.g., Michael Inbar, Mom: Bullying Drove My 10-Year Old Girl to Suicide, TODAY 
SHOW, Nov. 18, 2011, http://www.today.com/id/45354766/site/todayshow/ns/today-
parenting_and_family/t/mom-bullying-drove-my—year-old-girl-suicide/;Vivian Yee, On Staten 
Island, Relentless Bullying is Blamed for a Teenage Girl’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/nyregion/suicide-of-staten-island-girl-is-blamed-on-
bullying.html?_r=0. 
 3. See A.O. Scott, Behind Every Harassed Child?: A Whole Lot of Clueless Adults, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, http://movies.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/movies/bully-a-documentary-by-lee-
hirsch.html?_r=0. 
 4.  See, e.g., VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL, ARIANA BELL & J. FRED SPRINGER, ANALYSIS OF 
STATE BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/opepd/ppss/ 
reports.html#state-bullying-laws. 
 5.  U.S. Department of Education, Upcoming: U.S. Department of Education to Host Third 
Annual Bullying Prevention Summit, www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/upcoming-us-department-
education-host-third-annual-bullying-prevention-summit. 
 6.  Maryellen T. Kueny & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of School Anti-Bullying Laws in the 
United States, 43 MIDDLE SCH. J. 22, 29 (Mar. 2012); STUART-CASSEL, BELL, & SPRINGER, supra 
note 4, at 34. 
 7.  See, e.g., supra note 4, at 34. 
 8.  See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009) (holding that 
 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/1
01 HOLBEN  ZIRKEL 3FINAL MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:35 PM 
2014] SCHOOL BULLYING LITIGATION 301 
systematic research on the frequency and outcomes of these court cases.9 
Responding to this gap in the professional literature, this study will 
analyze the case law specific to bullying in the public school context 
during a recent twenty-year period.  More specifically, its scope will 
include the frequency and the outcomes of the liability and “free and 
appropriate public education” (“FAPE”)10  claims on a longitudinal 
basis.  Part I of the article provides the context in terms of (a) the 
definition of bullying, and (b) the literature concerning the rate and 
effects of bullying as well as the extent of anti-bullying policies and 
practices at the school district and state levels.  Part II provides the 
methodological information, including the scope of and variables for the 
data collection.  Part III reports the results of the data analysis.  Part IV 
discusses the significance of the results, with recommendations for 
further research concerning the frequency of claims addressing specific 
types of bullying and the demographics of the plaintiff victims as well as 
the implementation of best practices for educators to proactively prevent 
bullying-related liability litigation. 
II. CONTEXT 
A. Definition of Bullying 
As an initial matter, establishing a definition of bullying is akin to 
Justice Potter Stewart’s reflection that, while he found it difficult to 
define obscenity, he knew it when he saw it.11  The first obstacle is to 
distinguish between bullying and harassment.  In the context of student-
to-student conduct, “harassment” typically refers to discriminatory acts 
toward a member of a protected class12 as defined by federal civil rights 
Title IX does not preclude § 1983 claim based on equal protection clause for peer sexual 
harassment); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (establishing multi-part test 
for liability for peer sexual harassment, including gender-based bullying, under Title IX). 
 9.  Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 6, at 25. 
 10.  Although marginal, claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”) for denials of “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) are included for the sake of 
completeness.  Although money damages are not available under the IDEA, the remedies of 
compensatory education and tuition reimbursement may have a costly effect on school districts.  
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 
4 (2011). 
 11.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 12.  See, e.g., Michael B. Greene & Randy Ross, The Nature, Scope, and Utility of Formal 
Laws and Regulations that Prohibit School-Based Bullying and Harassment, 95-96 (2005), 
available at http://gwired.gwu.edu/hamfish/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/16896/n/off/other/1/ 
name/GreeneandRoss5237Paperpdf/. 
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laws.13  However, bullying is often based on factors extending beyond 
protected class,14 such as personal appearance, social relationships, or 
personality.15  Thus, harassment and bullying overlap, and we include 
the claims under federal civil rights laws to the extent that they fit within 
the boundaries of bullying.  Second, a certain amount of negative 
interaction between students is developmentally appropriate; the 
definition of bullying must identify behaviors that go beyond the 
ordinary childhood incidents of teasing or fighting.16 
To address both of these issues, we have used the generally 
accepted bullying definition developed by Dan Olweus, a Norwegian 
researcher.17  Specifically, the Olweus definition stipulates three key 
characteristics: (a) aggressive behavior or intentional harm toward 
another student; (b) this behavior is repeated over time; and (c) an 
imbalance of power that renders the victim unable to effectively 
establish a defense against the aggressive conduct.18  Further, these 
behaviors may be physical, verbal, or relational actions, and they may 
aim directly or indirectly at the victim.19  Finally, in accordance with the 
recent trend among educators and legislators, we treat cyber-bullying—
i.e., “willful, repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell 
phones, and other electronic devices”20—as a subset of verbal and 
relational bullying between minors.21 
 13.  E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents discrimination based on race, 
color, or national origin; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination 
based on gender; and both § 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit discrimination 
against persons with disabilities.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (2006); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 
(2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).  The lead case establishing the multipart test, or set of standards, 
for liability of school districts for peer harassment is Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 
526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 14.  Neither these civil rights laws nor other federal legislation or regulations address bullying 
per se.  See, e.g., STUART-CASSEL, BELL & SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 17. 
 15.  See, e.g., Julie Sacks & Robert S. Salem, Victims Without Legal Remedies: Why Kids 
Need Schools to Develop Comprehensive Anti-Bullying Policies, 72 ALB. L. REV. 147, 149 (2009). 
 16.  See, e.g., Tracy Tefertiller, Out of the Principal’s Office and into the Courtroom: How 
Should California Approach Criminal Remedies for School Bullying?, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 
168, 169-70 (2011). 
 17.  Dan Olweus, A Profile of Bullying, 60 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 12 (2003). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id at 14. 
 20.  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Fact Sheet: Identification, 
Prevention, and Response, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
 21.  See, e.g., Kelsey Farbotko, With Great Technology Comes Great Responsibility: 
Virginia’s Legislative Approach to Combating Cyberbullying, 15 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 38 (2011). 
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B. Frequency and Effects of Bullying 
The ongoing publicity concerning a number of high-profile bullying 
cases has created a public awareness of bullying incidents and their 
consequences.  Several recent studies of the prevalence of bullying 
among teenagers found that approximately 20%-25% of students ages 
12-18 self-reported experiencing bullying at school within the past 
year.22  One study reported the rate to be 50%.23  For cyber-bullying, the 
more limited research to date has reported rates ranging from 6%24 to 
20% of teens.25 
The frequency of bullying is a major issue for educators because 
victims experience a higher risk of depression and suicidal ideation due 
to the low self-esteem that develops from bullying,26 which in turn 
creates both academic and peer group difficulties in the school setting.  
Victims of bullying also experience greater difficulty establishing 
friendships, suffer from the humiliation of peer knowledge of the 
bullying incidents, and develop a greater risk of abuse of drugs or 
alcohol.27  Other negative consequences include lower school attendance 
rates and the potential for the victim to become a bully in return.28  Thus, 
schools have an interest and, at least professionally,29 a duty to engage in 
efforts to prevent bullying. 
C. School District Bullying Policies 
In response to its frequency and effects, various groups proposed 
recommendations for stronger measures to prevent and punish bullying.  
 22.  JILL DEVOE & CHRISTINA MURPHY, STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING AND 
CYBERBULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2009 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (Aug. 2011);http://nces.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2011336; 
SIMONE ROBERTS, JIJUN ZHANG, & JENNIFER TRUMAN, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND 
SAFETY ( 2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011002.pdf; Tefertiller, supra note 16, at 17.5 
 23.  JOSEPHSON INSTITUTE, BULLYING AND VIOLENCE: THE ETHICS OF AMERICAN YOUTH, 
(2010), http://charactercounts.org/programs/reportcard/2010/installment01_report-card_bullying-
youth-violence.html. 
 24.  DEVOE & MURPHY, supra note 22, at 5. 
 25.  Tefertiller, supra note 16, at 17.6 
 26.  See, e.g., id. at 172-173; Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between 
Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMPLE. L. REV. 
641, 647-50 (2004). 
 27.  Tefertiller, supra note 16, at 17. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Similarly, this ethical norm is the basis for the converse conclusion that students have the 
right to be educated in an environment free of fear and without disruption to academic performance.  
See, e.g., Nathan Essex, Bullying and School Liability: Implications for School Personnel, 84 
CLEARINGHOUSE 194 (May 2011). 
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These recommendations include (a) the development and enforcement of 
anti-bullying policies, including clear reporting procedures, prompt 
investigation, and appropriate consequences; (b) timely notice of the 
anti-bullying policy to parents and students; (c) staff development that 
addresses awareness of the frequency of teen bullying and appropriate 
responses when bullying incidents occur; and (d) implementation of 
student anti-bullying programs that encourage peer support and student 
reporting of incidents.30 
However, the literature also shows that the scope and enforcement 
of these policies are not devoid of problems, including legal limitations.  
For example, governmental and official immunity present a barrier in 
many states to liability suits against school districts and their personnel 
premised on negligence in response to student bullying.31  Moreover, for 
verbal bullying in public schools, the First Amendment freedom of 
expression may pose a significant consideration or limitation.32  While 
schools have the authority to punish speech that causes, or foreseeably 
will cause, a substantial disruption, what constitutes a substantial 
disruption is rarely a bright-line determination.33  This interpretation 
becomes even more blurred for incidents of cyber-bullying; schools 
must determine whether there is a sufficient nexus between the off-
campus speech and the in-school actual or potential disruption.34  
Similarly, the afore-mentioned35 overlap with harassment introduces the 
legal limitations for schools—and, conversely, the legal protections for 
students—under the various civil rights laws.36 
 30.  Id. at 195; Olweus, supra note 17, at 15. 
 31.  See, e.g., STUART-CASSEL, BELL & SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 9; Weddle, supra note 26, 
at 674.  For the varying patterns among states, see Peter Maher, Kelly Price & Perry A. Zirkel, 
Governmental Immunity for School Districts and Their Employees: Alive and Well?, 19 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 234 (2012). 
 32.  Tefertiller, supra note 16, at 183.  For the relevant case law governing regulation of 
public school student speech, see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 33.  See, e.g., Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, 80 J. 
SCH. HEALTH 614, 619 (2010). 
 34.  Andrew B. Carrabis & Seth D. Haimovitch, Cyberbullying Adaptation from the Old 
School Sandlot to the 21st Century World Wide Web, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 145 (2011).  See, 
e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d. 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011); J.C. v. Beverly Hills 
Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 35.  See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
 36.  By providing an alternative for protected groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, 
and by extending to limited, extreme situations of students more generally, § 1983 provides the 
basis for claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, 
respectively. 
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D. State Anti-Bullying Laws 
The responding legal framework in recent years has expanded in 
terms of new or strengthened anti-bullying laws at the state level.  
According to successive studies, the number of state anti-bullying laws 
was approximately fifteen in 2003,37 sixteen in 2004,38 twenty-one in 
2009,39 and forty-three in 2010.40  Most of these statutes are unfunded 
mandates, and they vary widely in their scope and sanctions.41  
Moreover, the trend continues to be in flux.42 
The published analyses to date have reported several key areas of 
variance, starting with the definition of bullying among these state laws.  
For example, these definitions often do not include all of Olweus’ 
generally accepted criteria.43  Similarly, the state laws vary from 
covering only the federally protected class groups to adding additional, 
particularly vulnerable, categories, such as gender identity or perceived 
sexual orientation.44  These studies not only analyzed the provisions of 
the state anti-bullying laws,45 but also identified deficiencies and 
recommended revisions.46 
E. Case Law Specific to Bullying 
In contrast to the coverage of state anti-bullying legislation, the 
literature lacks systematic study of the litigation concerning bullying.  
The lines of pertinent case law on various grounds, such as Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process, federal civil rights laws, and 
negligence, thus far have received only peripheral attention incidental to 
 37.  Michael J. Furlong, Gale M. Morrison & Jennifer L. Greif, Reaching an American 
Consensus: Reactions to the Special Issue on School Bullying 32 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 456, 462 
(2003). 
 38.  Fred Hartmeister & Vickie Fix-Turkowski, Getting Even with Schoolyard Bullies: 
Legislative Responses to Campus Provocateurs, 195 EDUC. L. REP. 2 (2005). 
 39.  John Dayton & Anne Proffit Dupre, A Child’s Right to Human Dignity: Reforming Anti-
Bullying Laws in the U.S., 28 IRISH EDUC. STUD. 333, 338 (2009). 
 40.  Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 6, at 26. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  For example, an increasing number of states are currently moving toward legislation that 
criminalizes bullying.  See, e.g., STUART-CASSEL, BELL, & SPRINGER supra note 4, at 20. 
 43.  See id. at 25; see, e.g., Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 6, at 27. 
 44.  Sacks & Salem, supra note 14, at 148-49. 
 45.  See, e.g., STUART-CASSEL, BELL & SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 6; Dayton & Dupre, supra 
note 39, at 336; Furlong, Morrison & Greif, supra note 37, at 458; Hartmeister & Fix-Turkowski, 
supra note 38, at 10; Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 6, at 27. 
 46.  See, e.g., Hartmeister & Fix-Turkowski, supra note 38, at 3; Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 
6, at 29. 
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other bullying issues, such as liability concerns for school personnel,47 
legal bases for bullying litigation,48 or limitations of anti-bullying 
policies and statutes.49  Consequently, Kueny & Zirkel believe 
“comprehensive, up-to-date systematic study is warranted for the 
pertinent case law.”50 
III. METHOD 
The purpose of this study is to systematically analyze the case law 
specific to student-on-student bullying in the public school context from 
1992 through 2011. The specific questions addressed are as follows: 
 
1. What was the total number of court decisions, and what 
were the key characteristics of the plaintiff (i.e., protected 
class or not) and defendant (i.e., individual and/or 
institutional)? 
2. What was the total number of claim rulings,51 and what was 
the distribution in terms of legal bases (e.g., Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection, Title IX, or negligence)?52 
3. What was the longitudinal trend in the frequency of court 
decisions and claim rulings? 
4. What were the outcome distributions for the claim rulings 
(a) overall and (b) longitudinally? 
5. What was the outcomes distribution of the claim rulings 
disaggregated by legal basis? 
6. What was the outcomes distribution of the court decisions 
in terms of the most plaintiff-favorable claim rulings per 
decision (a) overall and (b) longitudinally?53 
 
 47.  See, e.g., Essex, supra note 29, at 1; Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: 
A Review of the Legal Issues Facing Educators, 55 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE 71 (2011). 
 48.  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Jaffe & Robert J. D’Agostino, Bullying in Public Schools: The 
Intersection Between the Student’s Free Speech and the School’s Duty to Protect, 62 MERCER L. 
REV. 407 (2011); Tefertiller, supra note 16, at 172; Weddle, supra note 26, at 644. 
 49.  See, e.g., STUART-CASSEL, BELL & SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 1; Kueny & Zirkel, supra 
note 6, at 29; Sacks & Salem, supra note 15, at 149-52. 
 50.  Kueny & Zirkel, supra note 6, at 30. 
 51.  “Claim rulings” refers to a unit of analysis at a component level of court decisions.  More 
specifically, it refers to an adjudicated claim under one of the legal bases classified herein.  For a 
more detailed description, see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
 52.  For the classifications of legal basis, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 53.  For this approach to return to the court decision as the unit of analysis, see infra note 108 
and accompanying text. 
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The chronological scope was the twenty-year time period from 
January 1, 1992, to December 31, 2011.  The case-law scope consisted 
of “published” court decisions in the broad sense of being available in 
the Westlaw database rather than the narrower sense of being in an 
official, hard-copy reporter series, such as the Federal Reporter or the 
Federal Supplement.  The subject-matter scope was the following 
combination of criteria: (1) the bully and the victim were K-12 public 
school students, regardless of whether the bullying was on or off 
campus; (2) the plaintiff was a student and/or the student’s parents; (3) 
the defendant was a school district and/or its individual employees; and 
(4) the facts54 fit within the generally accepted Olweus definition of 
bullying.55 
The first two steps were searching and screening.  The search in the 
Westlaw database, within the designated starting and ending dates, was 
via the alternate terms of “bullying,” “harassment,” “teasing,” or 
“hazing,” each in combination with the terms “school,” “students,” 
and/or “peer.”  Next was careful screening of the published opinions of 
the resulting court decisions in relation to the aforementioned56 selection 
criteria. Thus, for example, the exclusions were bullying cases (1) in 
non-public schools,57 (2) where the primary bully was an adult rather 
than another student;58 and (3) not congruent with the Olweus criteria, 
such as cases where (a) the perpetrator, due to cognitive limitations, 
lacked an intent to harm the victim;59 (b) the harmful behavior was 
limited to an isolated incident;60 or (c) the victim displayed an effective 
 54.  “Facts” here includes allegations in court opinions deciding dismissal and summary 
judgment motions. 
 55.  For the elements of this definition, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
 56.  See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
 57.  E.g., Whitfield v. Notre Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517, 519 (3d Cir. 2011); Doe v. 
Kamehameha Sch., 625 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2010); C.J.S. v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts, No. 11-1471, 
2011 WL 3629171 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011); M.Y. v. Grand River Acad., No. 1:09 CV 2884,  2010 
WL 2195650 (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2010); Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., 738 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (D. 
Conn. 2010); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010). 
 58.  E.g., Cockrell v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. 1, No. 3:11-CV-2-42-CMC, 2011 WL 
5554811 (D. S.C. Nov. 15, 2011). Culbertson v. Fletcher Public Sch. Dist., No. CIV-11-138-M, 
2011 WL 3477112 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 9, 2011); H.M. v. Kingsport City Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:05-
CV-273, 2009 WL 2986606 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2009); O’Conner v. Meyer, No. CV065006438S, 
2008 WL 5481704 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008). 
 59.  E.g., A.B. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:08-CV-041 (CDL), 2009 WL 902038 (M.D. 
Ga. Mar. 30, 2009). ; J.N. v. Pittsburgh City Sch. Dist., 536 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Pa. 2008); Jones 
v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (W.D. Pa. 2005). 
 60.  E.g., Halladay v. Wenatchee Sch. Dist., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (E.D. Wash. 2009); 
Creekbaum v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 80 So.3d 771 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
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self-defense rather than an imbalance of power.61  Moreover, even where 
the facts aligned with the bullying definition, the case was excluded if 
the bullying behavior was not the target of one or more adjudicated 
claims, instead being tangential to other disability-related62 or regular 
education63 issues.  Similarly excluded as tangential were cases where 
the focus of the plaintiffs’ challenge was not specific bullying behavior, 
but rather either disciplinary consequences64 or a bullying policy.65  The 
exclusions also extended to court opinions that lacked sufficient facts66 
to determine whether the case fit within the Olweus criteria.67  Finally, 
the selection excluded cases of physical or sexual assault, including rape, 
by a student peer when the assault was neither the culmination of nor the 
stimulus for bullying behavior toward the victim.68 
 61.  E.g., Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000); T.C. v. 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 577, 584 (S.D. N.Y. 2011); J.M. v. Hopkins Sch. Dist., No. 
Civ. 01-2124 MJD/SRN, 2003 WL 41639 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2003). 
 62.  E.g., K.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 373 F. App’x 204, 206 (3d Cir. 2004); N.T. v. 
Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. JKB-11-356, 2011 WL 3747751 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2011); 
J.L. v. Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (E.D. Miss. 2010); Lewellyn v. 
Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 8:07-cv-1712-T-33TGW, 2009 WL 5214983 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 
2009); S.M. v. W. Contra Costa Cnty. Unified Sch. Dist. Fin. Corp., No. C 07-5829 CW, 2009 WL 
1033826 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2009); Ron J. v. McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:05CV257, 2006 
WL 2927446 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006); State of Hawaii v. L.K., No. 05-00616 JMS/BMK, 2006 
WL 1892220 (D. Hawaii July 10, 2006); Mr. and Mrs. I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, No. 
Civ. 04-165-P-H, 2005 WL 1389135 (D. Me. June 13, 2005); Sylvie M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Dripping 
Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 681 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
 63.  E.g., C.H. v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 415 F. App’x 541 (5th Cir. 2011); M.G. v. E. Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 186 (3d Cir. 2010); Doe v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 759 F. Supp. 
2d 522 (D. Del. 2011); DNK v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV-02513-MSK-CBS, 2006 WL 
2331086 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2006); Walden v. Moffett, No. CV-F-04-6680 REC DLB, 2005 WL 
2155572 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2005). 
 64.  E.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). Wayne v. 
Shadowen, 15 F. App’x 271, 274 (6th Cir. 2001); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 
F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 2000); Donavan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1995); J.K. v. 
Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 849 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 (D. Minn. 2011); J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified 
Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 65.  E.g., Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011); Nuxoll v. 
Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd 
Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2008); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 
(9th Cir. 2006); Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 245 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 66.  See supra note 62. 
 67.  E.g., D.T. v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. App’x 697 (2d Cir. 2009); Hill v. Bradley 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 F. App’x 740, 741 (6th Cir. 2008); Peters v. Bd. of Tr. of the Vista Unified 
Sch. Dist., No. 08cv1657-L (NLS), 2009 WL 4626644 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009); Davis v. Hooper, 
No. 07-632-GMS, 2008 WL 4220062 (D. Del. Sept. 15, 2008); Ronald D. v. Titusville Area Sch. 
Dist., 159 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 68.  E.g., Webb v. Warner Middle Sch., 349 F. App’x 677, 678 (3d Cir. 2009); Winzer v. Sch. 
Dist. City of Pontiac, 105 F. App’x 679, 680 (6th Cir. 2004); Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 849 
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The third step was coding of the cases that met all the selection 
criteria.  For those cases subject to successive court decisions, the basis 
of the coding was the final decision on the merits.  Thus, the coding did 
not include decisions or claim rulings specific to technical or procedural 
issues, such as admission of evidence,69 or those concerning attorneys’ 
fees.70  Similarly, the coding did not include decisions on the merits that 
were subject to reversal or modification upon further proceedings.71 
Although the initial unit of analysis for the selection was the court 
decision, the ultimate unit of analysis for the coding was the “claim 
ruling,”72 which is the combination of two categories—legal basis (e.g., 
Title IX) and defendant type (e.g., individual district employees).73  The 
categories for the federal and state legal bases, respectively, were the 
(6th Cir. 1999); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999); Doe v. 
Jackson Local Sch. Dist., 695 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Pemberton v. W. Feliciana 
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 09-30-C, 2010 WL 431572 (M.D. La. Feb. 10, 2010); Jones v. Ewing Twp. Bd. 
of Educ., No. 3:09-cv-3536 (FLW), 2010 WL 715554 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2010); T.Z. v. City of New 
York, 635 F. Supp. 2d 152, 164 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 
09-245 WBS CMK, 2009 WL 2424608 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009); Doe v. Allentown Sch. Dist., No. 
06-cv-1926, 2009 WL 536671 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2009); Renguette v. Bd. of Sch. Tr. Brownsburg 
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1037 (S.D. Ind. 2008); Doe v. Upper St. Clair Sch. Dist., 
No. 08-0910,  2008 WL 4861892 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2008); D.J. v. Stevens Elementary Sch., No. 
07-579, 2008 WL 4722654 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2008). 
 69.  See, e.g., K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2011); R.W. v. Georgia Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:07-CV-535-WSD, 2007 WL 2915911 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2007). 
 70.  See, e.g., C.H. v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 415 F. App’x 541, 548 (5th Cir. 2011); M.G. v. 
E. Reg’l High Sch. Dist., No. 08-4019 (RBK), 2009 WL 3489358 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2009); O’Conner 
v. Meyer, No. CV065006438S, 2008 WL 5481704, *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008); State of 
Hawaii v. R.L.K., No. 05-00616 JMS/BMK, 2006 WL 1892220 (D. Hawaii July 10, 2006). 
 71.  See, e.g., Moore v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d. 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 72.  For the model for this type of empirical analysis, see Perry A. Zirkel & Caitlyn A. Lyons, 
Restraining the Use of Restraints for Students with Disabilities: An Empirical analysis of the Case 
Law, 10 CONN. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 323 (2011).  “Claim ruling” in this context refers to 
disaggregating the court decision into each adjudicated issue category in terms of the designated 
categories of the legal bases and the two types of defendant (i.e., individual and institutional).  Id. at 
333-36.  The primary advantage of this unit of analysis is precision for not only frequency but, more 
importantly in this context, outcome.  However, for practical purposes, the initial calculation of 
frequency and the ultimate calculation of outcome are included herein in terms of court decisions as 
the unit of analysis.  However, because the bullying case law—unlike that specific to restraints—
was not characterized by multiple decisions on the merits, this analysis did include the larger unit of 
analysis, of the Zirkel & Lyons study, which was the case.  Here, the case and the decision are 
effectively synonymous. 
 73.  The outcomes within either type were conflated as one claim ruling except in the limited 
instances where they differed.  For example, if the court dismissed the claims based on Title IX 
against four different individuals, they were coded as one claim ruling, but if the outcome was 
different for one of them, the coding resulted in two claim rulings—one for the three that had the 
same outcome and the other for the one with a different outcome. 
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bulleted items as follows:74 
 
Federal State 
Constitutional: Constitutional 
• Amend. I expression    E.g., equal protection 
• Amend. XIV procedural due 
process 
 
• Amend. XIV substantive due 
process 
• Amend. XIV equal protection 
• Constitutional right to privacy 
Legislation/Regulations 
   E.g., state civil rights act 
   E.g., state education code  
    E.g., state special education law 
Statutory:    E.g., state anti-bullying statute 
• Title VI (race or ethnic 
discrimination) 
   
• § 504 or Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
Intentional Torts: 
• Title IX (sex discrimination) • Assault and battery 
• Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”) 
• Intentional infliction of 
mental distress 
• §§ 1981, 1985, and/or 1986 
(conspiracy) 
Recklessness or gross 
negligence75 
 
   Negligence 
 
The categories for the defendant were limited to two types—
institutional and individual.76  For example, an adjudication of Title IX 
claims against the school district and five named individual school 
employees counted as two claim rulings, one for institutional defendants 
and one for individual defendants.  If an individual school employee 
claim ruling included multiple defendants, and rulings differed among 
the defendants, the ruling was considered a split ruling.77  Conversely, 
 74.  This claims categorization was a customization of the same Zirkel-Lyons model.  Zirkel 
& Lyons, supra note 72, at 335. 
 75.  This approximate term here refers generically to common law torts intermediate between 
negligence and intentional torts, where the alleged gravity is variously termed reckless or wanton 
conduct or gross negligence. 
 76.  See Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, at 334. 
 77.  While Zirkel & Lyons tallied the rulings for each individual defendant, due to the volume 
of cases and claims, this study considered all individual defendants together and provided one 
aggregate ruling.  If the rulings differed for various individual school employees on the same claim, 
the analysis considered the ruling to be a split ruling. 
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the coding of the decisions excluded their rulings for claims separable 
from bullying behavior (e.g., the parent’s defamation claim)78 or specific 
to additional defendants beyond those associated with public schools 
(e.g., a police officer or social services employee).79  Similarly, the 
coding did not cover claims that were not subject to adjudication in the 
court decision (e.g., those reserved for further proceedings that were not 
subsequently published). 
For both institutional and individual school employee claim rulings, 
the coding identified the outcome for the claim.  Specifically, the 
outcome entry for each claim ruling was in accordance with Chouhoud 
and Zirkel’s five-category scale:80 
 
1 = conclusively for the plaintiff (i.e., parent of the child and/or 
the child) 
2 = inconclusively for the plaintiff (e.g., denial of motion for 
dismissal)81 
3 = split between plaintiff and defendant 
4 = inconclusively for the defendant (e.g., denial of plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment)82 
5 = conclusively for the defendant 
 
After training with the second author based on a pilot sample of the 
finally selected court decisions, the first author coded the claim rulings 
for all of the cases, consulting with the second author as needed to insure 
accurate coding of complicated claims.83  The coding entries for each 
claim ruling were recorded on a spreadsheet84 that included the case 
citation, type of defendant, legal basis of each claim ruling, and outcome 
of each claim ruling.  Claims against institutional and individual school 
employee defendants were recorded separately, as they were considered 
 78.  See, e.g., Gelinas v. Boisselle, No. 10-30192-KPN, 2011 WL 5041497 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 
2011) (claims concerning violation of First Amendment rights to complain publicly about bullying); 
O’Connor v. Meyer, No. CV065006438S, 2008 WL 5481704 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) 
(claims concerning parental liability); Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 924 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) 
(claims concerning no contact order). 
 79.  See, e.g., C.H. v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 415 F. App’x 541 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 80.  Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis, 45 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353, 368 (2008); see also Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, at 336. 
 81.  Other examples include denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment or granting 
of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 82.  Another example would be dismissing a claim without prejudice. 
 83.  For a prior example of the same procedure, see Diane Holben & Perry A. Zirkel, 
Empirical Trends in Teacher Tort Liability for Student Fights, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 151, 161 (2011). 
 84.  This spreadsheet is available from the first author (holbendm@npenn.org) upon request. 
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separate outcomes for the analysis. 
IV. RESULTS 
The total number of court decisions from the beginning of 1992 to 
the end of 2011 within the scope of the Olweus definition of bullying 
was 166.  Of these 166 decisions, 148 (89%) were in federal court, with 
the remainder in state court.  The plaintiffs were members of a protected 
class in 140 (84%) of the 166 decisions, with the most frequent 
categories being gender (n=67), disability (n=27), perceived sexual 
orientation (n=25), and race/ethnicity (n=20).85  The majority of the 
decisions named both institutional and individual school employee 
defendants (n=112), with almost all (n=163) including the institutional 
type (i.e., school district).86 
These 166 decisions contained 742 claim rulings.87  The most 
frequent legal bases of these rulings were Title IX (n=116), Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process (n=112), Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection (n=111), negligence (n=81), and state legislation 
(n=54).  The state legislation was typically a civil rights law or a state 
constitution equal protection claim, but only infrequently an anti-
 85.  Reflecting the wide variance among scholars, advocates and other individuals in the 
terminology and definitions regarding gender and sex, courts have not been entirely consistent in 
their interpretation and application of the equal protection clause and Title IX in bullying and 
harassment cases.  For the sake of uniformity, we follow the guidance of the Office for Civil Rights 
(“OCR”), which has defined gender-based harassment as based on “sex or sex-stereotyping, even if 
those acts do not involve conduct of a sexual nature.”  This broad definition includes harassment 
based on perceived sexual orientation; frequently, but not exclusively, this perceived sexual 
orientation references harassment based on the assumption that the victim is homosexual.  
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, (OCR 2011), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. Thus, for the purpose of this 
study, the protected category of gender represents female students who sued for either sexual 
harassment or gender-based harassment that also met the aforementioned criteria for bullying, with 
students bullied due to perceived sexual orientation categorized separately. 
 86.  Institutional defendants included the school district and/or the school board sued in their 
official capacities.  Individual school employee defendants included administrators, teachers, or 
other personnel employed by the district.  Only three cases solely named individual defendants.  
Evans v. Bd. of Educ. Sw. City Sch. Dist., 425 F. App’x 432, 433 (6th Cir. 2011) (ruling limited on 
appeals to qualified immunity for claims against principal for gender discrimination, although 
previous lower court decision concerned not only principal but also district); Crispim v. Athanson, 
275 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242-43 (D. Conn. 2003) (claims against a principal and a teacher for racial 
harassment); Washington v. Pierce, 895 A.2d 173 (Vt. 2005) (claims against a principal for 
violation of state law prohibiting student-on-student harassment). 
 87.  Thus, the overall average number of claim rulings was 4.5 per decision.  State court cases 
had a ratio of 2.6 claim rulings per decision, while federal court cases had a ratio of 4.6 claim 
rulings per decision.  The average more closely reflects the federal ratio due to the low proportion 
(11%) of state court decisions. 
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bullying law (n=6). 
Figure 1 provides the frequency of court decisions and claim 
rulings for the successive four-year intervals within the period 1992 
through 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Longitudinal Trend in Frequency of  
                 Court Decisions and Claim Rulings 
 
The frequency of court decisions started at a negligible level in the early 
1990s but steadily increased in the subsequent intervals.  Similarly, the number 
of claim rulings increased at each interval, with the ratio fluctuating to a 
relatively limited and balanced extent around 4.5 per court decision during the 
entire period.88  The proportion of claims also remained relatively constant 
between individual (45%) and institutional (56%) defendants during each 
interval.89 
 
 
 88.  The average number of claim rulings per court decision for each successive interval was: 
4.0 for 1992-95; 5.0 for 1996-99; 4.4 for 2000-03; 4.2 for 2004-07; and 4.6 for 2008-11. 
 89.  See, e.g., supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.  The number of claims includes both 
institutional and individual school employee claims as separate claim rulings, increasing the number 
of claims per decision.  The overall ratio aligns to the ratio for federal decisions as these represented 
148 of 166 decisions analyzed. 
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The overall outcomes distribution of the 742 claim rulings was as follows: 
• conclusively for the plaintiff(s) – 2% (n=11) 
• inconclusively for the plaintiff(s) – 21% (n=159) 
• relatively even split between the parties – 5% (n=37) 
• inconclusively for the defendant(s) – 10% (n=72) 
• conclusively for the defendant(s) – 62% (n=463)90 
Thus, on a claim-by-claim basis, the outcomes, particularly the polar, 
conclusive rulings, were clearly skewed in favor of the district defendants.  
Figure 2 disaggregates these claim rulings among the successive four-year 
intervals, with the first two intervals combined due to their low numbers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Longitudinal Trend of Outcome Distribution  
                 for Claim Rulings 
 
 90.  “[P]laintiff(s)” here serves simply as a shorthand way of designating the parent and/or 
student, and “defendant(s)” does the same for the district and its employees. 
           (n=89)             (n=136)         (n=218)           (n=299) 
Conclusive for Plaintiff 
Inconclusive for Plaintiff 
Split Decision 
Inconclusive for Defendant 
Conclusive for Defendant 
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An examination of Figure 2 reveals that the claim rulings predominantly 
favored the defendants during each interval, with the pattern particularly 
consistent during the last three intervals, which was also the time of the highest 
frequency.  More specifically, during the three most recent intervals, the 
outcome was conclusively in favor of the district defendants for approximately 
two thirds of the claim rulings, with most of the remainder being inconclusive 
or intermediate; conversely, the proportion of claim rulings conclusively in the 
plaintiffs’ favor was less than three percent.91 
For each of the designated92 federal bases, Table 1 summarizes the 
frequency and outcomes distribution of the claim rulings for the entire period by 
federal legal basis.93  The sequence of legal bases is in descending order of their 
respective frequencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91.  Alternatively viewed in terms of conflated outcomes categories on each side, the 
relatively stabilized level during the three most recent intervals was approximately 75% 
conclusively or inconclusively in favor of the defendants and approximately 20% conclusively or 
inconclusively in favor of the plaintiffs. 
 92.  For the designated categories, see supra note 74 and accompanying text (bulleted items 
under “Federal”). 
 93.  All federal claim rulings were decided by federal courts. 
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 Outcomes 
Student                                                District 
    1               2               3            4           5 
Title IX (n=118)94 5% 30% 8% 1% 56% 
Am. XIV substantive 
due process (n=112) 
0% 14% 2% 4% 80% 
Am. XIV equal protection 
(n=111) 
0% 23% 3% 7% 67% 
ADA/§ 504 (n=38) 0% 18% 6% 0% 76% 
IDEA (n=27)95 4% 37% 7% 7% 45% 
Title VI (n=17) 0% 12% 6% 0% 82% 
Am. XIV procedural 
due process (n=16) 
0% 25% 0% 0% 75% 
Am. I expression (n=14) 0% 7% 0% 14% 79% 
§ 1985/§ 1986 conspiracy 
(n=11) 
0% 0% 0% 9% 91% 
Constitutional right to 
privacy (n=5) 
0% 0% 20% 0% 80% 
§ 1981 (n=4) 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Miscellaneous others 
(n=12)96 
0% 0% 17% 0% 83% 
TOTAL (n=485) 1% 19% 5% 4% 71% 
 
Table 1.  Outcome Distribution and Frequency  
               for Each Federal Claim 
 
 94.  For rulings conclusive for the plaintiff, see Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 
F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming jury decision, noting that the standard of liability under Title IX 
was appropriate); Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming lower 
court ruling that student was sexually harassed and district response was clearly inadequate); Mathis 
v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-0034, 2011 WL 3320966, (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2011) 
(denying district request for post-trial relief from jury verdict); Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch. 
Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 384-85 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding that severe, pervasive harassment 
occurred and district personnel did not take sufficient steps to halt it). 
 95.  For rulings conclusive for the plaintiff, see Shore Reg. High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 
381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (ruling that district district’s proposed placement was not 
appropriate due to risk of continued severe and pervasive bullying and the parent’s unilateral 
placement was appropriate based on child’s academic and social progress, thus awarding tuition 
reimbursement).  A recent policy letter from the U.S. Department of Education repeated an earlier 
reminder to school districts about the importance of protecting students with disabilities from 
bullying, with a new distinction—specifically, the Section 504 provides relevant protection limited 
to disability-based harassment, whereas the IDEA applies to harassment, regardless of whether 
based on the child’s disability, if so severe as to constitute denial of FAPE. Department of 
Education, Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (OSERS 2013), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/bullyingdcl-8-20-13.pdf. 
 96.  Each of the legal bases in this catchall category had a frequency of 3 or less.  Examples 
are FERPA (n = 1), federal safe school law (n= 1), and First Amendment retaliation (n=1). 
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The most frequent federal legal basis cited was Title IX, closely followed 
by Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claims with the other federal bases being far less numerous.  
Although the outcomes, on balance, clearly favored the district defendants for 
each enumerated federal category, parents fared best, on the losing side, for 
claims under the IDEA and Title IX.97  Moreover, the total proportion of federal 
claim rulings conclusively in favor of the district defendants (70%) was higher 
than the corresponding proportion (62%) for the overall (i.e., federal and state) 
claim rulings.98 
Table 2 displays the corresponding frequency and outcomes for each of 
the designated99 state legal bases in descending order of frequency.100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97.  Although the IDEA was the only basis for which conclusively defendant-favorable 
rulings were not in the majority, the plaintiffs’ limited counterbalancing outcomes were largely in 
the inconclusive category.  Moreover, as explained supra note 10, the IDEA claims are marginal in 
terms of the liability focus of the analysis.  For Title IX, the defendants’ conclusive rulings were in 
the majority, and plaintiffs had a similar partial counterbalancing effect limited largely to the 
inconclusive category. 
 98.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 99.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (bulleted items under “State”). 
 100.  The legal basis does not equate to the judicial forum.  More specifically, federal courts 
accounted for several of these rulings via their discretionary supplemental jurisdiction for state 
claims; when federal courts declined supplemental jurisdiction without prejudice, the ruling was 
considered inconclusive for the defendant. 
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 Outcomes 
Student                                              District 
  1            2              3               4            5 
Negligence (n=81)101 2% 24% 7% 27% 40% 
State legislation/regulations 
(n=54)102  
4% 40% 4% 11% 42% 
Intentional infliction  
of emotional distress (n=38) 
0% 18% 3% 37% 42% 
Recklessness, wanton 
misconduct, gross negligence 
(n=26) 
0% 23% 0% 12% 65% 
Assault/battery (n=12) 0% 33% 0% 33% 33% 
State constitution (n=21) 0% 0% 10% 0% 90% 
Miscellaneous others 
(n=23)103 
0% 4% 4% 21% 71% 
TOTAL (n=257) 2% 23% 5% 21% 49% 
 
Table 2.  Outcome Distribution and Frequency for Each State Claim 
 
Comparing the bottom lines of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that state claims 
were far less frequent than federal claims104 and that the skew in favor of 
district defendants was less pronounced for state than federal claims.105  
Reviewing Table 2 alone reveals that negligence and state codes (i.e., 
 101.  For the two rulings conclusively in favor of the plaintiff, see M.W. v. Panama Buena 
Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 508, 511 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming lower court finding of 
liability for negligence in student sexual assault); Moore v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d 
612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming verdict finding district liable for negligence due to pervasive 
sexual harassment and reversing determination of board immunity). 
 102.  This category includes state civil rights acts, state education codes, state special education 
laws, and state anti-bullying laws.  The sole ruling conclusively in favor of the plaintiff was based 
on the state civil rights law corresponding to Title IX, see L.W. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007) (concluding that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
applies to student-on-student harassment based on an individual’s perceived sexual orientation if the 
school district’s failure to reasonably address that harassment has the effect of denying the student 
any of the school’s accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges).  The only cases that 
included a basis on a state anti-bullying law were in Connecticut, and in both cases, the court ruled 
that this law lacked an express or implied private right of action.  Dornfried v. Berlin Bd. of Educ., 
No. CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639, *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2008); Santoro v. Town of 
Hamden, No. CV040488583, 2006 WL 2536595, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2006). 
 103.  Each of the legal bases in this catchall category had a frequency of three or less.  
Examples are state open records act (n=1) and state anti-hazing statute (n=1). 
 104.  More specifically, the respective proportions of the state and federal law legal bases were 
35% (n=257) and 65% (n=485). 
 105.  For example, the percentage of rulings conclusively in favor of the defendants was 49% 
for state law legal bases compared to 71% for federal law bases, although the remainder tended to 
be in the inconclusive categories.  At the opposite pole, the respective percentages conclusively in 
favor of the plaintiffs were only 2% and 1% for the state and federal law bases. 
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legislation and/or regulations) were not only the most frequent but also among 
the most plaintiff-favorable legal bases of the state claims.106 
Finally, Figure 3 reanalyzes the longitudinal outcomes distribution of 
Figure 2 in terms of court decisions rather than claim rulings, again with the 
first two four-year intervals combined due to their low numbers.  For the 
purpose of returning to the usual unit of analysis,107 the claim ruling most 
favorable to the plaintiff represents the outcome of the court decision.108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Longitudinal Trend of Outcome Distribution for Court  
                 Decisions (Via Plaintiff’s “Best” Claim Ruling) 
 106.  These two state legal bases were the only ones that yielded rulings that were conclusively 
in favor of the plaintiffs.  However, the negligible number of these rulings, the relatively low 
frequency for many of these other bases, and the relatively high proportions in the inconclusive 
categories precluded comparisons that are more definitive. 
 107.  Customarily, the parties and others view litigation results in terms of cases or decisions, 
which are basically synonymous here.  See supra note 72. 
 108.  For the model for this conversion, see Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, at 344.  This 
approach, which—like any alternative (e.g., calculating the average outcome of all the claim rulings 
for each court decision or trying to weight each claim ruling in terms of its monetary value or 
estimated importance)—is only a limited approximation.  However, it was the choice here because, 
like the litigation analyzed in Zirkel & Lyons, it fits with the so-called spaghetti strategy that has the 
common aim—with the IDEA FAPE cases being at the margin—of liability.  It is also 
approximately in-line with the conception of whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party in the 
context of attorneys’ fees, which is a latent issue in the majority of these cases. 
                   (n=17)              (n=31)             (n=52)            (n=66) 
Conclusive for Plaintiff 
Inconclusive for Plaintiff 
Split Decision 
Inconclusive for Defendant 
Conclusive for Defendant 
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Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 reveals that on a decision-by-decision 
basis, when the most parent-favorable outcome is selected among the claims 
that the plaintiff raised and the court adjudicated, the skew in favor of districts 
persisted, but on a notably reduced basis.  More specifically, on this basis, the 
relatively stable pattern for the three most recent intervals changed from 60%-
65% to 40%-45% conclusively in favor of the district defendants.109  
Conversely, the corresponding change on the other side was largely in terms of 
an expansion of the category of decisions inconclusively in favor of the 
plaintiffs.110 
Based on this same best-outcome approach for conversion from claim 
rulings to court decisions, the overall outcomes distribution was as follows: 
• conclusively for the plaintiff(s) – 5% (n=8) 
• inconclusively for the plaintiff(s) – 34% (n=57) 
• relatively even split between the parties – 5% (n=8) 
• inconclusively for the defendant(s) – 15% (n=24) 
• conclusively for the defendant(s) – 41% (n=69) 
As compared to the aforementioned111 outcomes distribution for claim 
rulings, this less pronounced district-favorable pattern represents, in effect, the 
other end of the range for characterizing the overall outcomes of the adjudicated 
bullying cases.112  The balance still favors the defendants but the conflated 
categories (i.e., conclusive and inconclusive) on each side (i.e., defendant: 
plaintiff) change from 72:23% to 56:39%.113 
V. DISCUSSION 
Bullying is a pervasive national problem that has taken a prominent 
position on the agenda for K-12 school leaders, as evidenced by the dramatic 
increase in the number and scope of state anti-bullying laws.  Yet, in contrast to 
major attention in the national media and professional literature to various other 
aspects of this problem, policy makers and practitioners have not had available 
a systematic analysis of the case law.  To address this gap, this study 
 109.  Similarly, adding the 4’s in with the 5’s, the proportion in favor of districts for the last 
three intervals changed from approximately 75% to slightly less than 60%. 
 110.  For the last three time periods, the proportion in this category expanded from slightly less 
than 20% to slightly more than 30%.  The decisions conclusively in favor of the plaintiffs increased 
notably but still did not exceed 5% and trended slightly downward rather than upward during the 
latest interval. 
 111.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 112.  The difference between the claim rulings analysis and this decision analysis is a decrease 
from approximately 60% to approximately 40% conclusively in favor of districts, with the major 
corresponding increase from 21% to 34% in the decisions inconclusively for the parents. 
 113.  The small residual category of relatively evenly split outcomes remained at 5% for both 
units of analysis. 
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empirically analyzed the extent and nature of the published court decisions for 
cases fitting the prevailing definition of bullying,114 with special attention to 
liability-related outcomes. 
A. Total Number of Court Decisions and Key Characteristics of 
Plaintiffs 
Overall, the study identified 166 pertinent cases during the twenty-year 
period 1992-2011.  Of these decisions, institutional defendants were more 
frequent than individual defendants, although the plaintiff named both types in 
two thirds of the cases and, for the individual type, typically more than one 
school employee.  The multiplicity of named defendants was likely attributable 
to the plaintiffs’ efforts to maximize their chance of establishing liability, with 
the “deeper pocket” of the district included in almost every case. 
Similarly shaped by liability based on the coverage of civil rights laws, the 
plaintiff in at least 84%115 of cases was a member of a protected class.  The 
most common protected classes were gender and perceived sexual orientation, 
attributable to not only the intersecting coverage of the equal protection clause 
and Title IX for sexual harassment116 but also the prevailing discrimination in 
society and its youth against females and, even more, against perceived or 
actual homosexuals.117  Within this predominant protected category, the 
plaintiffs in the perceived sexual orientation cases were males subjected to anti-
gay verbal taunts and physical harassment.118  Conversely, female plaintiffs 
 114.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 115.  This proportion was an undercount because it was limited to identification in the court 
opinion associated with the prima facie requirements of one or more civil rights laws.  For example, 
the gender of the alleged victim was only identified and counted for Fourteenth Amendment or Title 
IX claims. 
 116.  See supra note 8. 
 117.  The courts have shown difficulty in addressing this social stigma.  See, e.g., Nabozny v. 
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming, without deciding, that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender were identical under Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection); Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Sch., No. 12-10354, 2012 WL 2450805, 
*9-10 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012) (distinguishing between sexual connotations and sexual causation 
for same-sex harassment under Title IX); Drews v. Joint Sch. Dist. 393, No. CV04-388-N-EJL, 
2006 WL 851118 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2006) (distinguishing between perceived sexual orientation 
and actual sexual orientation when claiming discrimination under Title IX); Patenaude v. Salmon 
River Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 3:03-CV-1016, 2005 WL 6152380, *5-6 (N.D. N.Y. Feb. 16, 2005) 
(considering that the determination of whether the use of specific derogatory terms is gender-based 
harassment depends upon the manner and context in which those terms are used); L.W. v. Toms 
River Reg. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007) (recognizing perceived sexual orientation 
as a protected class under state anti-bullying law). 
 118.  See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996) (claiming equal 
protection violations due to perceived sexual orientation); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 
F. Supp. 2d 135, 139-40 (N.D. N.Y. 2011) (claiming severe and pervasive harassment under Title 
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were more likely to claim sexual or gender-based harassment based upon 
traditionally heterosexual name-calling or physical harassment.119  Partly 
attributable to these and other civil rights claims and partly attributable to their 
generally higher verdicts than in state courts, the clear majority (89%) of the 
166 cases were in federal court.  Contributing to the low proportion of bullying 
cases in state court is the general, although varying, pattern of immunity for 
school districts and their employees to state torts.120 
B. Total Number of Claim Rulings and Distribution of Legal Bases 
In response to the second question of the study,121 the 166 cases, or 
decisions,122 yielded 742 claim rulings.  This disaggregated unit of analysis is 
relatively conservative; it is based on the legal basis and defendant type, not 
extending to (1) claims that the plaintiff raised but the court did not address and, 
with a limited exception,123 (2) separate rulings for each of the named 
defendants.  The majority (65%) of claim rulings relied upon federal rather than 
state legal bases, with the most frequent legal bases being, in order, Title IX, 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, and Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection.  Reliance upon federal constitutional and civil rights claims 
avoids limitations of state immunity to tort liability.124  However, the coverage 
IX and state law based upon perceived sexual orientation); Sandoval v. Merced Union High Sch., 
No. CV-F-06-066 REC/DLB, 2006 WL 1171828 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2006) (claiming verbal and 
physical harassment as well as death threats based upon gender and sexual orientation); 
Shaposhnikov v. Pacifica Sch. Dist., No. C 04-01288 SI, 2006 WL 931731 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 
2006) (citing harassment based upon his status as a competitive ballroom dancer and conservative 
manner of dress); Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(claiming verbal and physical harassment based upon advocacy of tolerance toward homosexuals). 
 119.  See, e.g., Doe v. Hamden, No. 3:06-CV-1680(PCD), 2008 WL 2113345 (D. Conn. May 
18, 2008) (claiming offensive touching and verbal intimidation following an off campus rape); 
Addison v. Clarke Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-CV-05 (CDL), 2007 WL 2226053 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 
2, 2007) (citing fondling and offensive touching in school and on the bus); Bruning v. Carroll 
Community Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902-04 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (claiming offensive touching 
and gender-based verbal slurs by a group of male students); Leffler v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 04-2141, 2005 WL 2008234 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005) (citing verbally harassing 
conduct by a male student).  Contra Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
340-41 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (alleging sexual harassment of a female student by another female student). 
 120.  See Maher, Price, & Zirkel, supra note 31.  E.g., Dornfried v. Berlin Bd. of Educ., No. 
CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2008); Bell v. West Haven Bd. of 
Educ., No. NNHCV970399597, 2005 WL 1971264 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2005); Albers v. 
Breen, 806 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Golden v. Milford Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., No. CA2010-11-092, 2011 WL 4916588, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011). 
 121.  See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See supra note 72. 
 123.  The limited exception was for legal bases where the outcome differed among defendants 
within the individual type.  See supra note 74. 
 124.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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of federal civil rights laws may cause a skew in relation to the actual incidence 
of bullying to those cases based on protected class status,125 and the 65% is 
similarly skewed in relation to the actual incidence of bullying litigation due to 
the lesser likelihood of state cases being published.126  Additionally, the higher 
ratio of claims per decision for federal court cases may represent in part a 
greater tendency for plaintiffs to include state law claims in federal court cases 
to avoid state immunity limitations.127 
C. Longitudinal Trend of Court Decisions and Claim Rulings 
The third finding was that the frequency of the bullying cases and their 
corresponding claims rulings rose steadily from the earliest to the most recent of 
the four-year intervals.  This longitudinal trend was generally in line with the 
trend for K-12 student litigation128 but in partial contrast with the moderating 
trend for K-12 school discipline cases more specifically.129  The boundaries of 
this study are different from those for discipline case law in at least two ways: 
(1) the focus here is liability,130 and, conversely, (2) overlapping cases, i.e., 
those where the challenge focused on disciplinary consequences, were one of 
the exclusions.131 
The contributing factors for the steady growth of bullying cases during the 
past two decades likely include the continuing attention in the mass media and 
professional literature, an expansion of the use of Title IX and the Fourteenth 
 125.  For recognition of the wider incidence, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.  On the 
other hand, the concomitant high frequency of substantive due process claims, which is generic in 
terms of plaintiff status, serves to moderate this skew. 
 126.  See, e.g., William A. Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators—Part I, 33 
J.L. & EDUC. 213, 222 (2004).  The difference is especially although not exclusively applicable to 
the trial level.  Id. 
 127.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An 
Update, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4-5 (2011) (increasing from 1,762 in 1990-99 to 2,728 in 2001-09, 
though less pronounced for the larger, non-disability category); Susan A. Leonard, Trends in 
Education-Related Litigation: 1986-2004 (September 5, 2007) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, 
University of Kansas) (on file with first author) (litigation growth parallel to increase in student 
population). 
 129.  See, e.g., Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Still Judging School Discipline, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN EDUCATION 238, 247 (Joshua Dunn & 
Martin West eds., 2009) (steady increase from 1990 to 2000, but lower frequency until final year of 
2007); Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 79, at 370 (leveling off during the last period, which was 
2001-2005). 
 130.  As a partially closer analogy, Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, focused on liability within 
the narrower area of the use restraints for students with disabilities.  Their results showed a leveling 
off in 1999-2006, but a major increase in 2007-10.  Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, supra note 129, 
at 340. 
 131.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment as the legal basis for bullying claims,132 and the recognition of 
protected classes not explicitly stated in federal civil rights legislation.133  On 
the other hand, the recent expansion of anti-bullying laws was not a direct 
contributor in light of their negligible frequency as a direct or, via negligence 
theory, an indirect legal basis for the 742 claim rulings.  Moreover, the 
persistent unfruitful outcomes did not appear to dampen the frequency of this 
litigation.  Perhaps the plaintiffs and their attorneys are ill informed or, via the 
sensationalizing selective skew of the media, misinformed.134 
D. Overall and Longitudinal Distribution of Outcomes 
In response to the fourth question,135 the overall outcomes of the claim 
rulings clearly favored the district defendants.  For example, 62% of the claim 
rulings were conclusively in their favor in comparison to 2% conclusively in 
favor of the plaintiffs.136  Moreover, this pattern was relatively consistent on a 
longitudinal basis during this twenty-year period, with no particular abatement 
in the plaintiffs’ direction.137  This overall and longitudinal distribution of 
outcomes is consistent with systematic analyses of various other areas of 
student litigation.138  The principal reasons appear to be (1) the re-emergence of 
the deference doctrine, i.e., the traditional tendency of the judiciary, especially 
but not exclusively the federal courts, to provide ample latitude to public school 
authorities, during the recent decades,139 and (2) the corresponding effect of 
state immunities to tort liability.140 
 132.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 80, at 375. 
 135.  See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 136.  See supra notes 89 and accompanying text.  The higher proportion of inconclusive 
rulings in favor of the plaintiffs (21%) than in favor of the defendants (10%) only partially mitigated 
this dramatic disparity.  Id. 
 137.  See supra Figure 2. 
 138.  See, e.g., Arum & Preiss, supra note 129, at 248 (student discipline); Chouhoud & Zirkel, 
supra note 80, at 369-70 and 372 (student suspensions); Holben & Zirkel, supra note 83, at 162 
(fighting); Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, at 341-342 (restraints). 
 139.  See, e.g., Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 1999) (proclaiming that 
“[s]ubstantive due process is not a license for judges to supersede the decisions of local officials and 
elected legislators”).  For more general background, see, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 
326 (1975) (emphasizing that “the system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies 
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members”). 
 140.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the federal courts’ discretionary 
decision to deny supplemental jurisdiction for ancillary state claims in these bullying cases 
accounted for many of the inconclusive rulings for districts, because they were implicitly or 
explicitly without prejudice.  To the extent that we found no evidence of corresponding subsequent 
decisions in these cases in state courts, these 4’s arguably should have counted as 5’s, thus 
increasing the aforementioned, supra note 126, dramatic disparity. 
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E. Outcomes Disaggregated by Legal Basis 
The majority (62%) of the claim rulings were on federal legal bases, led 
by Title IX, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection.141  The outcomes clearly favored the district defendants across 
all of these federal bases, but—aside from the relatively infrequent and 
marginal IDEA claim rulings—the parents fared best under Title IX.  This 
proclivity for Title IX is apparently attributable to Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education,142 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Title IX 
provided the basis for liability for peer harassment based on gender but only 
upon meeting a rather uphill set of standards.143  The high bar plaintiffs must 
clear for a conclusive Title IX ruling is apparent; only four Title IX rulings were 
conclusive for the plaintiff, and three of those four rulings were appeals of a 
lower court decision.144 
Substantive due process occupied second-place in terms of frequency but 
its particularly pro-district position in terms of outcomes comports with (a) its 
generic applicability in comparison to the protected-groups orientation of Title 
IX and other civil rights bases and (b) the courts’ disinclination to use it as a 
license to second-guess school district actions and decisions.145  Equal 
protection claims were in third place, with a frequency not much lower than that 
for substantive due process claims, and the outcomes were similarly skewed in 
favor of the district defendants.  In these cases, courts often cited a lack of 
evidence that the schools’ response to reported bullying was based on disparate 
treatment of the victim due to membership in a protected class.146 
Conversely, the state legal bases accounted for not much more than one 
 141.  See supra Table 1. 
 142.  Davis v. Monroe Cnty Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 143.  The standards, in addition to the requisite connection to gender, include (1) severity, 
pervasiveness, and objective offensiveness amounting to denial of access to educational 
opportunities and benefits, (2) actual knowledge by decision-making officials, and (3) deliberate 
indifference.  Id. 
 144.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 145.  See, e.g., Broaders v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 8:10-CV-2411-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 
2610185, *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2011) (concluding that “a mere failure [of] Defendant to direct 
more resources toward student safety and protection will seldom, if ever, be cognizable under the 
due process clause”); Risica v. Dumas, 466 F. Supp.2d 434, 440 (D. Conn. 2006) (reasoning that “a 
school’s failure to prevent the bullying from continuing does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation”); O.H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-99-5123 JCS, 2000 WL 33376299, *11 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2000) (explaining that “mere failure to act cannot be a basis for liability under 
the Due Process Clause”). 
 146.  See, e.g., Kirby v. Loyalsock Twp. Sch. Dist., 837 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 (M.D. Pa. 
2011); Roe v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1024 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Barmore v. 
Aidala, No. 04-CV-0445, 2006 WL 1978449, *11 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 12, 2006); Snelling v. Fall 
Mountain Reg’l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, *9 (D. N.H. Mar. 21, 2001). 
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third of the claim rulings and the seemingly less pronounced skew in favor of 
district defendants is largely limited to the rulings conclusively favoring 
defendant (49% v. 71%).147  Tempering this difference is the relatively high 
proportion of state-based rulings inconclusively favoring the defendant, largely 
attributable to the discretionary denial of supplemental jurisdiction in federal 
court for ancillary state claims.  Combining the conclusive and inconclusive 
rulings favoring the defendant for the state legal bases yields a proportion of 
70% in favor of the district defendants, which is much closer to the combined 
75% for the federal legal bases.  Yet, these comparisons are only tentative due 
to the high, albeit incomplete, correlation between legal basis and judicial 
forum148 and the intersecting skew of differential publication rates for the 
federal and state judicial forums.149  Within the state bases, negligence and state 
codes were the most frequent and among the most plaintiff-favorable, but the 
balance was still in the defendants’ favor and the impact for both of these 
theories of anti-bullying laws was notably negligible.150  The primary reasons 
for this low impact are likely the absence of a private right of action in such 
statutes151 and the apparent difficulty of using the alternate theory of negligence 
per se.152 
Although many states adopted anti-bullying laws in recent years,153 very 
few claim rulings were based on a state anti-bullying law.  Their paucity is 
attributable to their lack of a private right of action.  Unless and until state 
legislatures provide for such a bridge to litigation, it appears that the only 
theories available to plaintiffs would be to argue that the statute provides the 
basis for the legal duty element of negligence, whether the breach is accepted as 
negligence per se or is proven as one of the additional elements. Notably, none 
of the 166 cases in this study tested this possible avenue for liability. While 
these laws did not provide a significant basis for litigation, they may promote a 
more proactive approach for school districts to reduce the incidence of bullying, 
thereby potentially mitigating bullying-related litigation. 
 147.  See supra Table 2. 
 148.  Because diversity of citizenship usually does not apply in such K-12 litigation, the usual 
avenue for access to federal courts is based on federal questions, with any state claims having only 
ancillary status. 
 149.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 150.  See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
 151.  See, e.g., Dornfried v. Berlin Bd. of Educ., No. CV064011497S, 2008 WL 5220639 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2008) (denying claims under state anti-bullying statute because it 
contained no private right to action). 
 152.  See, e.g., O’Dell v. Case Grande Elementary Sch., No. CV-08-0240-PHX-GMS, 2008 
WL 5215329 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2008) (declining ancillary jurisdiction for negligence per se claim 
premised on state anti-bullying statute, reasoning that “the state court is best situated to decide 
[such] novel state law claims”). 
 153.  See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
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F. Overall and Longitudinal Outcomes Distribution for Most Plaintiff-
Favorable Claim 
Finally, reconfiguration of the outcomes on a decision-by-decision basis 
based on the most plaintiff-favorable claim ruling in each case results in a 
reduced but not reversed pro-district skew both longitudinally and for the 
twenty-year period overall.  This less pronounced balance in favor of district 
defendants appears to confirm the plaintiffs’ “spaghetti strategy of throwing 
everything against the wall and hoping something sticks.”154  The success here 
in terms of sticking to the wall for liability purposes extends beyond the 5% of 
decisions with conclusive rulings for the plaintiffs and, in part to the 5% split 
rulings to at least 34% of the cases with rulings inconclusively in their favor.155  
Only 41% of rulings were conclusive for the defendants, so the plaintiffs 
effectively could choose to continue litigation in 59% of cases.  The reason is 
that these inconclusive rulings provide leverage for obtaining a settlement that 
yields at least part of the damages sought, particularly for district insurers who 
primarily base their calculations on transaction costs rather than the objective 
odds of an ultimate decision in the defendants’ favor.  To the extent that this 
leverage applies to the particular circumstances of the case, it may also 
extend—albeit on a less weighty basis—to the rulings inconclusively in favor of 
the defendants.  However, the proportion of these cases resulting in settlement 
and the nature of these settlements are subject to speculation, being in the layer 
of the litigation iceberg156 that is well beyond the generally available databases. 
Using this study as a springboard of stimulus, further research is 
warranted, including (1) follow-up analyses with disaggregation for 
demographic features (e.g., grade level and other possible correlates of both the 
victims and the perpetrators) and/or jurisdictional features (e.g., states or 
circuits); (2) extensions of this methodology to suits where the plaintiffs are the 
bullies (e.g., where they challenge disciplinary consequences based on 
constitutional defenses) or where the bullying intersects with another major 
national concern—student suicide; (3) qualitative studies of the perceptions of 
the direct and indirect (e.g., other members of the school community) 
participants; (4) impact studies in terms of the knowledge, attitude, and 
practices resulting from such court decisions; and (5) traditional legal analyses 
of this litigation, the related legislation, and their interaction. 
 154.  Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 72, at 346.  The ratio of claim rulings to decisions in the 
Zirkel & Lyons analysis of liability litigation concerning restraints of students with disabilities was 
5.1, whereas the corresponding ratio here was 4.5.  See supra note 86. 
 155.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 156.  For the use of this metaphor, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Amanda Machin, The Special 
Education Case Law “Iceberg”: An Initial Exploration of the Underside, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 483, 486-
88 (2012). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In any event, the increasing frequency but persisting pro-district outcomes 
of bullying liability litigation confirms that bullying continues to be a serious 
issue for K-12 schools and that the solutions should not be based on 
sensationalized or hyperbolic threats of liability.  Carefully crafted legislation 
has its proper place, but it too is limited for several reasons, including (1) the 
lack of funding and enforcement in most of the anti-bullying laws to date;157 
and (2) the intersecting problem of the bewildering panoply of laws that apply 
to K-12 schools.158  The results of this study suggest that additionally – or even 
alternatively – the solution primarily rests on the educational mission and 
expertise of K-12 schools.  Thus, rather than legal liability, the key 
consideration arguably is determining and institutionalizing best practices for 
effective school climate that engenders a proactive approach to mutual respect 
for individual differences and dignity among students.159 
 
 157.  Whether to add a private right of action depends at least in part on the interpretation and 
assessment of the results of this systematic study of the litigation to date.  Other considerations 
include whether implementation is readily feasible.  See, e.g., Leslie Brody, Anti-Bullying Task 
Force Says Principals Need More Leeway, THE RECORD, Feb.1, 2013, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/189330121_Antibullying_task_force_says_principals_need_mor
e_leeway.html. 
 158.  See, e.g., James Self, Report: Most SC Schools Fail to Comply with State’s Sex Ed Law, 
THE STATE, Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.thestate.com/2013/01/31/2611990/report-most-sc-schools-
fail-to.html. 
 159.  This “a-legal” approach requires well-trained personnel, effective rewards for exemplary 
conduct, and—in light of the most common factual theme in these court cases—particular attention 
to student behavior relating to gender orientation. 
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